

The Honorable Ronald B. Leighton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

FAITH INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS,  
a Washington State non-profit corporation;  
AMAZING GRACE ADOPTIONS, a North  
Carolina non-profit corporation; and  
ADOPT ABROAD INCORPORATED, a  
Pennsylvania non-profit corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MICHAEL R. POMPEO, Secretary for the  
United States Department of State, in his  
official capacity; CARL C. RISCH,  
Assistant Secretary of State for Consular  
Affairs, in his official capacity;  
THEODORE R. COLEY, Director of the  
Office of Children’s Issues, in his official  
capacity; UNITED STATES  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, and  
COUNCIL ON ACCREDITATION FOR  
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,  
INC., a New York not-for-profit corporation,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-00731-RBL

**BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL  
FOR ADOPTION AND THE CHILD  
ADVOCACY PROGRAM AT HARVARD  
LAW SCHOOL AS AMICI CURIAE IN  
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION  
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

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**INTEREST OF THE *AMICI CURIAE***

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2       The **National Council For Adoption** (“NCFA”) is a nonprofit advocacy organization  
3 promoting a culture of adoption. Its mission is: “Passionately committed to the belief that every  
4 child deserves to thrive in a nurturing, permanent family, National Council For Adoption’s  
5 mission is to meet the diverse needs of children, birth parents, adopted individuals, adoptive  
6 families, and all those touched by adoption through global advocacy, education, research,  
7 legislative action, and collaboration.” Since its founding in 1980, NCFA has provided guidance  
8 and education on best practices in adoptive placements. It serves children, birthparents, adoptive  
9 families, adult adoptees, adoption agencies, U.S. and other governments, policymakers, media  
10 and the public. NCFA has trained more than 20,000 people on counseling expectant parents on  
11 the option of adoption and created a curriculum that many communities use for this purpose.  
12

13       **The Child Advocacy Program (“CAP”) at Harvard Law School** is a premier academic  
14 program focused on children’s rights. CAP is committed to the highest ethical, professional and  
15 scholarly standards in the advancement of children’s rights through facilitating productive  
16 interaction between academia and the world of policy and practice, through training students to  
17 contribute in their future careers to a better understanding of the rights of children, and to law  
18 and policy reform promoting children’s rights in the United States and around the world. In  
19 2009 CAP issued its International Adoption Policy Statement and Supporting Report, endorsed  
20 by many child-welfare and human-rights experts and organizations with adoption expertise.  
21

22       Given their specialized expertise, NCFA and CAP are able to provide this Court with  
23 critical insight about the important interests implicated by this case.  
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## STATEMENT OF FACTS

1  
2 The plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. 20) sets forth the factual  
3 background essential to resolving the motion. *Amici curiae* provide additional, focused  
4 background regarding the international agreement, federal statutes, and administrative practice  
5 governing the provision of cross-border adoptions.

### 6 **1. The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, The Intercountry** 7 **Adoption Act Of 2000, And COA's Accreditation Role**

8 The Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in  
9 Respect of Intercountry Adoption entered into force in the United States on April 1, 2008. In  
10 this brief, we refer to this international treaty as "the Hague Convention." The Hague  
11 Convention was drafted to respond to the phenomenon of cross-border adoption, which  
12 expanded slowly after the conclusion of World War II, and increased considerably in the 1970s.  
13 The signatory countries drafted and entered into the Hague Convention so that the leading  
14 nations of the world were applying a consistent, multilateral approach to ensure that intercountry  
15 adoptions take place in the best interests of the child.

16 Under the Hague Convention, the right of a child to grow up in a family is paramount.  
17 This is clear from the very first words of the Convention: "Recognising that the child, for the  
18 full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family  
19 environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding . . . ." Accordingly, the  
20 Hague Convention contains certain rules to ensure that adoptions take place in the best interests  
21 of the child, and with respect for his or her fundamental rights.

22 Chapter III of the Convention, entitled "Central Authorities and Accrediting Bodies,"  
23 contains several requirements germane to this dispute. Under Article 6(1), each "Contracting  
24 State"—here, that is the United States of America—must "designate a Central Authority" to  
25 carry out the duties imposed on Hague Convention signatories. In the Intercountry Adoption Act  
26 of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-279, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14901 *et seq.* (2000), passed after the  
27 Senate gave advice and consent to the Convention, the United States carried out the

1 Convention’s requirements, and designated the State Department as the Central Authority “[f]or  
2 purposes of the Convention and this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 14911(a)(1).

3 A Central Authority must ensure that only competent authorities perform functions under  
4 the Convention. Accordingly, Article 10 allows “accredited bodies”—here, this means adoption  
5 agencies—to perform some of the functions of Central Authorities. The Intercountry Adoption  
6 Act, in turn, empowers the Secretary to designate accrediting entities by “enter[ing] into  
7 agreements with one or more qualified entities under which such entities will perform the duties  
8 [of an accrediting entity] in accordance with the Convention, this subchapter, and the regulations  
9 . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 14922(a)(1). A nonprofit entity may qualify to become an “accrediting  
10 entity” only if, *inter alia*, it “has expertise in developing and administering standards for entities  
11 providing child welfare services.” *Id.* § 14922(a)(2)(A).

12 Pursuant to the Intercountry Adoption Act, in 2008 the Secretary of State designated the  
13 Council on Accreditation, or “COA,” a named defendant in this suit, as the entity that would  
14 perform the accreditation function for all United States adoption agencies. COA has performed  
15 the function of accrediting adoption agencies to conduct intercountry adoptions since 2008; since  
16 2013, it has been the *only* accrediting entity for intercountry adoption agencies. When an  
17 adoption agency was accredited, that accreditation generally would remain valid for four years,  
18 *see* 22 CFR § 96.60(a), at which time the agency would have to apply for reaccreditation. And,  
19 as plaintiffs have shown (Mot. at 3), COA regularly would, in the exercise of discretion granted  
20 under 22 CFR § 96.63(c), defer decisions on accreditation renewals past the prior accreditation’s  
21 expiration date with no interruption of the agency’s ability to conduct adoptions.

## 22 2. The State Department Changes Its Approach To Intercountry Adoption

23 In September 2014, Ms. Trish Maskew was appointed as the Chief of the State  
24 Department’s Adoption Division, a position she holds to this day. Prior to her appointment, Ms.  
25 Maskew was the president of a non-profit organization devoted to “adoption reform,” and in that  
26 capacity she advocated for even more regulations governing intercountry adoption, including  
27 authoring a law-review article entitled *The Failure of Promise: The U.S. Regulations on*

1 *Intercountry Adoption Under the Hague Convention*, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 487 (2008). In  
2 September 2016, now as Chief of the Adoption Division, she proposed a series of regulations  
3 that would have made intercountry adoption significantly more difficult, burdensome, and  
4 expensive. COA, the Obama Administration’s Small Business Administration, and more than 80  
5 intercountry adoption agencies operating in the U.S. opposed these proposed regulations. With  
6 the advent of the current administration and its proscription on new regulations, *see* Executive  
7 Order 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017), the proposed regulations have been shelved, but  
8 it now appears that their proposed restrictions are being implemented by other means, including  
9 by the agency actions at the heart of this case.

10 **a. The State Department Seeks To Replace COA With An Unqualified**  
11 **Accrediting Entity**

12 On August 8, 2017, the Department of State designated a second accrediting entity. The  
13 Intercountry Adoption Accreditation and Maintenance Entity, Inc., or “IAAME,” a newly  
14 created entity, was incorporated that same day. Since it was brand new, it obviously had no  
15 “expertise,” prior or demonstrated, “in developing and administering standards for entities  
16 providing child welfare services” as required by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 14922(a)(2)(A); *see also*  
17 22 CFR § 96.5(a) (accrediting entity “must” have “expertise in developing and administering  
18 standards for entities providing child welfare services”). IAAME’s lack of qualifications is  
19 under investigation by the State Department’s Inspector General. *See* Letter from Sen. Roger F.  
20 Wicker to Assistant Secretary Carl Risch (Feb. 14, 2018), *available at* <https://bit.ly/2MqffPp>.

21 Shortly thereafter, COA announced its intent to resign as an accrediting entity. However,  
22 IAAME was not then, and is not now, ready to act as an accrediting entity; indeed, its website  
23 repeatedly indicates that it is not currently processing accreditation requests. *See*  
24 Accredited/Approved Agencies/Persons, *available at* <https://bit.ly/2N6xBGb> (“Once IAAME  
25 begins to accredit and approve agencies and person [*sic*] IAAME will post to this page required  
26 information regarding all accredited and approved providers.”



1 COA could not precipitously resign and halt its accrediting duties, particularly in light of  
2 the fact that IAAME lacks expertise and is unable, at least at present, to immediately step into  
3 COA's shoes. Accordingly, the State Department announced that COA would cease its duties as  
4 an accrediting entity in December 2018, "unless COA and the State Department reach an  
5 alternative, mutually acceptable date for COA to cease such operations." Thus, after December  
6 2018 (or earlier), when COA ceases to be an accrediting entity, there will be no valid accrediting  
7 entity at all under the Hague Convention and the Intercountry Adoption Act, if (as it appears)  
8 IAAME was appointed in violation of the Act.

9 **b. The State Department Leaves Plaintiffs Unaccredited, And With No**  
10 **Place To Turn To Seek Accreditation**

11 This case concerns the State Department's changes to the longstanding reaccreditation  
12 procedures followed by COA with the blessing of the State Department. On April 2, 2018, the  
13 State Department issued a Notice indicating that because the three plaintiff agencies'  
14 accreditations had "expired while their renewal applications were pending" with COA, their  
15 "renewal applications have been refused and they are no longer accredited." U.S. Dep't of State,  
16 Adoption Notice: Accreditation Renewal Refusal for Amazing Grace Adoptions, Adopt Abroad  
17 International, and Faith International Adoption, Inc. (Apr. 2, 2018). The three plaintiff agencies  
18 were informed that they could file new applications for accreditation (not reaccreditation) with  
19 IAAME, which is not presently ready to act on such applications —and, because of its lack of  
20 the required "expertise," likely will never become a legitimate accrediting entity under the statute  
21 and the regulations. The agencies are not allowed to present their applications for accreditation  
22 afresh to COA; they must wait until IAAME, or some other legitimate accrediting entity, comes  
23 on line and can process their new applications.

24 The State Department, apparently recognizing that IAAME's legitimacy hangs on  
25 dubious threads, has issued a barely veiled threat against challenges to IAAME. On March 22,  
26 2018, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Carl C. Risch, a defendant here, issued a  
27 "Message from the Assistant Secretary – Intercountry Adoption" (available at

1 <https://bit.ly/2yNx74J>). Assistant Secretary Risch’s “Message” was clear: “Were efforts to  
 2 disrupt the AE [accrediting entity] transition effective, the Department would be left with no AE,  
 3 and accreditation and approval of ASPs [adoption services providers] would cease until a new  
 4 AE could be found, absent a change in the legislation governing intercountry adoptions. Such an  
 5 outcome would almost certainly result in the interruption of intercountry adoption to the United  
 6 States.”

7 As a result of the State Department’s precipitous change in policy, coupled with the  
 8 present unavailability of a viable accrediting entity, the plaintiff agencies cannot conduct  
 9 intercountry adoptions unless or until freshly accredited (not reaccredited) by a legitimate  
 10 accrediting entity, endangering their continuing survival. Currently, there is no such entity that  
 11 can process an accreditation application.

12 But these adoption agencies are not the only ones injured by the State Department’s  
 13 actions: Prospective American adoptive parents, either those whose applications or adoptions  
 14 were in progress with the three plaintiff agencies, or those wishing to utilize these agencies to  
 15 conduct intercountry adoptions, will be irretrievably damaged. And this says nothing about the  
 16 most important issue involved: the plight of the children in these other countries, who have  
 17 spent their lives in institutions, without the physical, psychological and social benefits of being  
 18 raised in loving families. Social science evidence is clear that such deprivation negatively  
 19 impacts well-being outcomes throughout these children’s lives.

## 20 ARGUMENT

### 21 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS

22 The plaintiff agencies have made a compelling case that they are likely to succeed on the  
 23 merits of their claims, thereby satisfying the first preliminary-injunction factor. Mot. at 10-18.  
 24 *Amici* will not repeat or reargue the points set forth in plaintiffs’ motion. *Amici* simply  
 25 underscores the basic fact that, with no warning to plaintiffs (or, it appears, to defendant COA),  
 26 the State Department pulled the rug out from under these agencies’ businesses. Where, prior to  
 27

1 March 30, 2018, they had every reason to expect a smooth reaccreditation process with no  
2 interruption to their adoption practices, the plaintiff agencies are now scrambling to figure out  
3 how to survive on a day-by-day basis, and are considering bankruptcy, deferring or eliminating  
4 salaries, or even shuttering. These adoption agencies now face a Kafkaesque bureaucracy, in  
5 which they must apply for accreditation to survive, but the bureaucracy has ensured that there is  
6 no one for them to apply to now, and, by appointing a new accrediting entity with no expertise,  
7 there may be no valid accrediting entity to apply to in the foreseeable future. As the plaintiff  
8 adoption agencies have so well demonstrated, the Administrative Procedure Act does not  
9 countenance this kind of sandbagging on the part of a federal agency. Mot. at 15.

10 **II. THE IRREPARABLE HARM BEING VISITED ON THE PLAINTIFF**  
11 **ADOPTION AGENCIES, AND THE HARMS TO AMERICAN ADOPTIVE**  
12 **FAMILIES, UNADOPTED CHILDREN, AND THE PUBLIC, CEMENT THE**  
13 **CASE FOR AN IMMEDIATE INJUNCTION**

14 The other preliminary-injunction factors—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and  
15 the public interest—all speak to the equity of granting a preliminary injunction. *See Weinberger*  
16 *v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1982). In this case, they point powerfully in favor of  
17 granting the requested injunction—so powerfully, in fact, that the Court should still grant the  
18 requested injunction even on a lesser showing of likely success on the merits, *e.g.*, “a substantial  
19 case on the merits.” *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 778 (1987); *Lair v. Bullock*, 697 F.3d  
20 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 2012) (“‘reasonable probability,’ ‘fair prospect,’ ‘substantial case on the  
21 merits,’ and ‘serious legal questions ... raised,’ are largely interchangeable” and will suffice  
22 where the other, equitable, factors are strongly demonstrated).

23 Again, *Amici* will not repeat the showings made in plaintiff’s motion (at 18-22), but will  
24 instead use this brief to amplify, for the Court’s benefit, the vastness of the tragic and irreparable  
25 harms that the State Department’s illegal actions are causing—harms to agencies, prospective  
26 parents, waiting children, and the public at large—harms reaching all corners of the globe.

1           **A. Irreparable Harm.** The plaintiffs’ motion makes out a compelling case that they  
2 are suffering immediate and potentially irreparable harm—their businesses are unlikely to  
3 survive if relief is delayed. *See* Mot. at 18-20. An imminent threat of bankruptcy, or other loss of  
4 an established business, and all of the good will that goes along with it, is a textbook case of  
5 irreparable harm. *Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (plaintiffs alleged  
6 “substantial loss of business and perhaps even bankruptcy” to support preliminary injunction;  
7 Court held that “[c]ertainly the latter type of injury sufficiently meets the standards for granting  
8 interim relief, for otherwise a favorable final judgment might well be useless”).

9  
10           If the plaintiff  
11           will agencies were forced into bankruptcy or closure, it would continue a disturbing  
12 pattern of closures of U.S. intercountry adoption agencies. In 2004, 22,884 children were  
13 adopted by U.S. parents from other countries. Miriam Jordan, *Overseas Adoptions by Americans*  
14 *Continue to Decline*, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2017, at A10, available at <https://nyti.ms/2outsQL>.  
15 In Fiscal Year 2017, only 4,714 children were adopted intercountry to the United States, the  
16 smallest number since 1973. U.S. Dep’t of State, *Annual Report on Intercountry Adoptions*, at 1  
17 (Mar. 30, 2018), available at <https://bit.ly/2Kemu0n>. This has corresponded with a decrease  
18 from more than 200 accredited intercountry adoption agencies a decade ago, to fewer than 150  
19 accredited agencies today.

20           But the irreparable harm from an agency’s closure extends far beyond the administration,  
21 staff, and employees of the agency. Indeed, the harm extends even beyond the unavailability of  
22 the agency to serve the interests of potential adoptive parents in the agency’s system, or those  
23 who had hoped to avail themselves of the agency’s assistance in the future. Adoption agencies  
24 are often repositories of critical records, which may need to be available to adoptees or birth  
25 parents alike. When an agency closes, those records may disappear, making it impossible, where  
26 the law allows, for adoptees to seek information about their birth parents, including what may be  
27

1 vital health and genetic information. In addition, adoption agencies often provide post-adoption  
2 services to families. They serve as liaisons between adoptive and birth families, allowing for the  
3 confidential and efficient exchange of letters, photographs, and the like. And many agencies  
4 provide counseling and other services to assist U.S. adoptive parents with concerns unique to  
5 intercountry adoption, ranging among such issues as separation anxieties, fetal alcohol exposure,  
6 or cultural adaptation. When the agency ceases to exist, so do those post-adoption services.

7 Indeed, the State Department's 2016 Report on Intercountry Adoptions sought to blame  
8 the lack of post-adoption reports from agencies as a reason that other countries have decreased or  
9 eliminated intercountry adoptions to the United States: "Several countries have conditioned the  
10 resumption of intercountry adoptions on receiving post adoption reports from parents who  
11 previously adopted children from that country." U.S. Department of State, *Annual Report on*  
12 *Intercountry Adoptions Narrative* at 3 (Oct. 31, 2016), available at <https://bit.ly/2MujZ6F>. It  
13 should go without saying that a defunct adoption agency not be able to fulfill this obligation.

14 **B. Balance of Equities.** As the plaintiff adoption agencies have shown (Mot. at 20-  
15 21), their claims of injury vastly outweigh any conceivable harm to the defendants. For purposes  
16 of considering this factor, *amici* urges the Court to keep in mind that the only valid interests  
17 possessed by the defendants are limited by the Hague Convention's, and the statute's, commands  
18 that the best interests of children are paramount in the interpretation and application of those  
19 legal instruments. And it is undeniable, as *amici* show below, that, faced with a choice of  
20 bringing willing American adoptive families together with adoptable children, or not, the Court  
21 should favor joining parents and children and making families, rather than leaving potential  
22 parents unfulfilled and potential adoptees in orphanages or similar institutions.

23 **C. The Public Interest.** The final preliminary-injunction factor is the one that looks  
24 beyond the interests of the particular parties to the lawsuit, and asks what outcome is best for the  
25 broader public. Here, going beyond plaintiffs' showings (Mot. at 21-22), the Court should  
26 consider not just the interests of non-profit adoption agencies such as plaintiffs, and  
27

1 governmental and accrediting entities such as the defendants, but to cast its gaze more broadly,  
2 to the people willing to become parents, and the children who need, but do not yet have, families.

3 We could start with the words of the Supreme Court, which “has frequently emphasized  
4 the importance of the family.” *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). It has called family  
5 “essential” (*Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); one of the “basic civil rights of man”  
6 (*Skinner v. Oklahoma*, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); and a right “far more precious . . . than  
7 property rights.” *May v. Anderson*, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). The reason for this is simple:  
8 “[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function  
9 and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” *Prince*  
10 *v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

11 This same recognition undergirds both the Hague Convention and the Act. The  
12 Convention starts with a series of recitations, among which are the recognitions “that the child,  
13 for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family  
14 environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,” and “that intercountry  
15 adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family  
16 cannot be found in his or her State of origin.” Hague Convention, prefatory recognitions. “The  
17 Convention recognises that growing up in a family is of primary importance and is essential for  
18 the happiness and healthy development of the child. It also recognises that intercountry adoption  
19 may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be  
20 found in his or her country of origin.” Outline, Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention, at 1,  
21 *available at* <https://bit.ly/2tGDGAo>. *See also* 42 U.S.C. § 14901(b)(2)-(3) (“ensur[ing] that  
22 [intercountry] adoptions are in the child’s best interest,” and “improv[ing] the ability of the  
23 Federal Government to assist United States citizens seeking to adopt children from abroad and  
24 residents of other countries party to the Convention seeking to adopt children from the United  
25 States” are two principal “purposes” of the Act).

26 These encomiums to the family are not just lofty prose; they are grounded in fact and  
27 science. By way of example, the University of Minnesota’s International Adoption Project has

1 engaged in a lengthy series of studies demonstrating that the longer a child is institutionalized  
2 without the care of a family at the beginning of his or her life, the more developmental problems  
3 will follow—among others, the absence of a permanent family structure is associated with  
4 problems with behavior, physical development, depression, nutrition, social engagement,  
5 executive functioning (*i.e.*, neurologically-based skills involving mental control and self-  
6 regulation), sensory development, and reactivity to stress. (We will not burden the Court with  
7 citations to all of these scientific authorities, except to note that they are available at  
8 <https://bit.ly/2tADraE/>.)

9 Similarly, when the Ceausescu regime fell in 1999, approximately 170,000 children were  
10 left in 700 overcrowded and impoverished orphanages across Romania. The Bucharest Early  
11 Intervention Project (BEIP), a vast and rigorous investigation, studied 136 abandoned infants and  
12 toddlers, half of whom had been placed in foster care (similar to what we know as adoption in  
13 the United States), while the other half remained in their institutions. The BEIP found that the  
14 institutionalized children were severely impaired in IQ and manifested a variety of social and  
15 emotional disorders, as well as changes in brain development. However, the earlier an  
16 institutionalized child was placed into foster care, the better the recovery, because of the critical  
17 role that early experience plays in brain development: “genes code for the basics and experience  
18 does the fine tuning . . . [and] when this principle is violated, brain development can be  
19 undermined, leading to profound alterations in behavioral development.” Charles A. Nelson,  
20 Nathan A. Fox, & Charles H. Zeanah, *Romania’s Abandoned Children: Deprivation, Brain  
21 Development, and the Struggle for Recovery* 4 (2014).

22 These studies do not represent the only research in the area; far from it. But they are  
23 illustrative of a principle that should be self-evident: Children are better off in families than in  
24 institutions. The longer a child is kept from being raised in a permanent family, the more  
25 damage is done to the child, and the likelihood that this damage becomes permanent increases  
26 dramatically with time, in every measurable respect. It is in the public interest to place these  
27 children with the willing parents who want them to become part of a family.

1 Granting the requested injunction will serve this important public interest.

2 **CONCLUSION**

3 *Amici curiae* urge the Court to grant the requested injunction.

4  
5 Respectfully submitted,

6  
7 Dated: June 28, 2018

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

Dated: June 28, 2018.

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